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Abstract
This work seeks to answer the population question, i.e. the eﬀect of popula-
tion growth on production per capita. This question has lingered in economic
thought for centuries and to this day two general lines of thought can be identi-
ﬁed, which might be marked as the optimist and the pessimist view. While
the optimists claim that an increase in population will  chieﬂy owed to con-
comitant specialization and technological progress  raise average production per
capita, the pessimists maintain that the latter would decline as a result of re-
sources becoming relatively more scarce. Integrating both approaches and using
a neoclassical framework, this work intends to show that sustainably increasing
productivity is predominantly the result of reducing too high fertility toward a
lower level such that diminishing returns are outweighed by the beneﬁts from la-
bor division. The paper argues that the historical reduction of fertility can almost
completely explain longrun development.
JEL classiﬁcation: B12, B22, J1, O47, N01, N3
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1 Introduction: The Population Question
This work seeks to answer the population question, i.e. the eﬀect of population
growth on production per capita. This question has lingered in economic thought for
centuries and to this day two general lines of thought can be identiﬁed, which might
be marked as the optimist and the pessimist view.1 While the optimists claim
that an increase in population will  chieﬂy owed to concomitant specialization and
technological progress  raise average production per capita, the pessimists maintain
that the latter would decline as a result of resources becoming relatively more scarce.
Integrating both approaches and using a neoclassical framework, this work intends to
show that sustainably increasing productivity2 is predominantly the result of reducing
too high fertility toward a lower level such that diminishing returns are outweighed by
the beneﬁts from labor division. This result is broadly in line with Galor (2011), who
suspects that a substitution of child quality for child quantity initiated the takeoﬀ
toward a sustained path of economic development. In particular, Ashraf et al. (2013)
ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of fertility on GDP per capita that can account for about 10%
of long-run growth. The paper argues that the historical reduction of fertility can
almost completely explain longrun development. Being a quite popular objection (e.g.
Becker (1991)), it will certainly be replied that the observed negative eﬀect of fertility on
productivity is merely another illustration of a statistical correlation being misread as
a causal eﬀect. This author intends to suﬃciently clarify that the modeled relationship
reﬂects a very deep insight from classical as well as neoclassical growth theory.3
To arrive at the above result, the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section
it will be explained that, building on the assumption of an eﬃcient division of labor,
the original neoclassical production function is already an exhaustive instrument in
determining productivity, even without explicitly accounting for technology.4 Follow-
ing Smith (1776) and the classical economists, the extension of the (static) production
function approach toward a neoclassical (dynamic) growth model is justiﬁed by the as-
1 See for example Bloom et al. (2003). For an optimist view, see for example Becker (1988) or Kremer
(1992). Examples of a pessimist view are Hardin (1968) or Ehrlich (1968).
2 For simplicity, production per capita will be abbreviated as productivity. We will also, following
Lucas (1988), refer to an increase in productivity (intensive growth) as economic development,
whereas the expression economic growth will be used to characterize an increase in gross production
(extensive growth). These terms have often been confused in the past, in particular in that literature
which is concerned with growth in economic development.
3 This paper does not attempt to model a theory of population. The perhaps most recent evaluation
of this paper's argument is provided by Chatterjee and Vogl (2018).
4 As is for example done by Romer (1986).
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sumption that additional labor is responsible for generating the beneﬁts from a division
of labor and is therefore the source of all value. The third section clariﬁes that what
was commonly meant by the variable labor should be substituted by the variable
unskilled labor, which is well approximated by population size. On this basis, a new
model of population as source of all value is presented, where regular innovations are
supposed to be embodied by population growth through a division of labor and sub-
sequent specialization and structural equations are derived. The latter are evaluated
in section four and brieﬂy linked to uniﬁed growth theory in section ﬁve. Section six
concludes and suggests possible extensions of the work.
2 A Labor Theory of Production and Development
2.1 Static Theory
The annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplies
it with all the necessaries and conveniences of life which it annually con-
sumes [...] 5
The one decisive regular cause by which population growth is classically assumed to
enhance production is the division of labor. Smith (1776) suggested that, in an environ-
ment favoring the security of property and income, the inherent tendency of individuals
to exchange their products would result in a division of labor.6 What Smith meant by
division of labor can be understood as the eﬃcient cooperation of all productive indi-
viduals of the economy to maximize total production. This eﬃcient level of cooperation
would be achieved if all production processes were perfectly subdivided between those
individuals. Such a perfect division implied that every new individual entering the econ-
omy would tend to induce a new subdivision of production into smaller, more easily
conductible, eﬃcient production processes and therefore raise production.7
Nonetheless, in spite of the generally observed tendency toward an eﬃcient division
of labor in a free market economy, the classics had already noted large regional diﬀer-
ences in individual productivity. Obviously, these diﬀerences were owed to the relative
abundance or scarcity of some other production factor. Senior (1836) extended the
5 Smith (1776), Introduction.
6 Throughout this paper we will presume the existence of such institutional conditions.
7 We may even relax the above presumption by stating that eﬃcient institutions are one result of
such a perfect division of labor.
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doctrine of labor division by stating that what Smith had really meant was the eﬃcient
subdivision of production processes through an eﬃcient combination of several pro-
duction factors.8 He argued that this concept ought in fact be termed the division of
production instead of the division of labor and could be formulated as a relationship
between production and an eﬃcient use of all these production factors  a production
function.9
Perpetuating this production function approach, Clark (1899) argued that, since
production factors are in reality dynamically interconnected, a separate analysis of the
eﬀect of every single factor required the consideration of an abstract static state of
an economy where production factors were assumed to be independent. To Clark, it
seemed obvious that the economist had to start with the easier task of modeling a
static production function ﬁrst, where all except the production factor of interest were
held constant (ceteris paribus) such that no causal relationships between production
factors interfered.10 Roughly at the same time, the static model was mathematically
advanced by Wicksteed (1894), adding to the above considerations the perhaps most
powerful proposition for employing a valid aggregate macroeconomic production func-
tion: the replication argument. It states that under static conditions, a replication of
an exhaustive list of production factors must universally generate a replication of pro-
duction. Correspondingly, an aggregate production function is to be deﬁned as a static
production function fulﬁlling the replication argument, which was later formulated as
the doctrine of constant returns to scale.11
Now it must of course be admitted that if the physical conditions under
which a certain amount of wheat, or anything else, is produced were exactly
repeated the result would be exactly repeated also, and a proportional increase
of the one would yield a proportional increase of the other. The crude divi-
sion of the factors of production into land, capital and labour must indeed
be abandoned [...]. We must regard every kind and quality of labour that
8 A production factor being deﬁned as an input resource that positively contributes to production.
9 [...] division of production would have been a more convenient expression than division of labour;
but Adam Smith's authority has given such currency to the term division of labour, that we shall
continue to employ it, using it, however, in the extended sense in which it appears to have been
used by Adam Smith. Senior (1836), p. 159.
10 Why, then, do we wish to know the laws of an imaginary static state? Because the forces that act
in such a state continue to act in a dynamic one. [...] In dealing with the complex problems of an
advancing economy, the key of success is the separate study of the static forces that constantly act
within it. Clark (1899), p. 60.
11 See Hicks (1936).
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can be distinguished from other kinds and qualities as a separate factor; and
in the same way every kind of land will be taken as a separate factor. [...]
Each of these may be scheduled in its own unit, and when this has been done
the enumeration of the factors of production may be regarded as complete.
On this understanding it is of course obvious, that a proportional increase
of all the factors of production, will secure a proportional increase of the
product. 12
Notwithstanding the requirement of an exhaustive list of factors, most classical econo-
mists seem to have agreed on the usage of merely two factors required for production
Y , labor L and capital K.13 Wicksteed declared the just use of this simpliﬁcation as
long as capital was viewed to serve as an approximate residual catchallvariable to
incorporate an exhaustive list of all hitherto omitted production factors required for
total production, measured in a complex unit, for example in exchange value.14 As a
result, capital could be deﬁned as all things of value required for production, whereas
the explicit use of other production factors would have unnecessarily complicated the
theoretical and empirical analysis  a simpliﬁcation that was later used by Keynes
(1936), Robinson (1954), Solow (1957) and many others.15,16 Obviously, when following
this deﬁnition, a potential factor speciﬁcally accounting for technology would become
obsolete.
Alongside to this generalized capital, labor remained the main factor of interest as
long as labor productivity Y
L
seemed to best measure individual productivity.17
12 Wicksteed (1894), p. 33.
13 Often, the additional factor land has been added: [. . . ] it has been usual to take each of the
great factors of production such as Land, Capital and Labour, severally, to enquire into the special
circumstances under which that factor cooperates in production [. . . ]. Wicksteed (1894), p. 7.
14 All the constituents of this generalised 'capital' are regarded as reduced to their expression in
money. Wicksteed (1894), p. 13.
15 The capital in existence at any moment may be treated simply as 'part of the environment on
which labour works.' Keynes (1936) in Robinson (1954), p. 214.
16 Were the data available, it would be better to apply the analysis to some precisely deﬁned produc-
tion function with many precisely deﬁned inputs. One can at least hope that the aggregate analysis
gives some notion of the way a detailed analysis would lead. Solow (1957), p. 312, footnote.
17 We follow here McCulloch's notion of productive labor: So long as an individual employs himself
in any way not detrimental to others, and accomplishes the object he has in view, his labour is
obviously productive; while, if he do not accomplish it, or obtain some sort of equivalent advantage
from the exertion of his labour, it is as obviously unproductive. This deﬁnition seems suﬃciently
clear, and leads to no perplexities; [. . . ] it is not possible to adopt any other without being involved
in endless diﬃculties and contradictions. McCulloch (1864), part I, chapter I, section II.
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Here, then, is the simple and decisive test by which we are to judge of the
expediency of all measures aﬀecting the wealth of the country, and of the
value of all innovations. If they make labour more productive, [...] they
must be advantageous; [...] Considered in this point of view, that great
branch of the science which treats of the production of wealth will be found
to be abundantly simple, and easily understood. 18
To this end, Wicksteed suggested that labor had to be separated out of the inﬁnite
number of production factors.
What we really want is to separate out labour and dose it with landpluscapi-
tal, if possible to satiety.19 [. . . ] It is perfectly legitimate to start with a unit
of [labour], assume that the command of the other factors of production is
so exercised as to secure the maximum productive result, and then treat the
product as a function of [labour] and pounds sterling. [. . . ] and we may, if
we choose, select any one factor to measure in its proper unit while measur-
ing all the rest in a common unit. 20
Moreover, Wicksteed concluded that such an aggregate production function implied
diminishing returns to each production factor, i.e. that an incremental static use of
any separate factor would yield an increasingly diminishing marginal product as well
as diminishing productivity of that factor.21 Hence, the idea of diminishing returns
became a universal law for the accumulation of any production factor, which is one
of the conclusive statements of the static theory of production.22 Cobb and Douglas
(1928) built on Wicksteed's approach and suggested a speciﬁc form of an aggregate
production function that would account for the above conditions.23 Their aggregate
production function Y = F (K,L) = KαL1−α with 0 < α < 1, where α reﬂects the
constant production elasticity of capital, is still a commonly taught instrument of the
18 McCulloch (1864), part I, chapter I, section II.
19 Wicksteed (1894), p. 14, footnote.
20 Wicksteed (1894), p. 39.
21 Wicksteed (1894), p. 14, footnote: Then if [labour] remains constant and capitalplus[land] in-
creases, we shall have increasing returns per unit of [labour] and decreasing returns per unit of
capital. But if capital is constant and [labour] increases, we shall have increasing returns per unit
of the former and decreasing returns per unit of the latter.
22 See for example Humphrey (1997).
23 The theory referred to (due to J.B. Clark, Wicksteed et al.) states that production, labor and
capital are so related that [...] production is a ﬁrst degree homogeneous function of labor and
capital. Cobb and Douglas (1928), p. 151.
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neoclassical growth school, although it does not necessarily display the true form of
the aggregate production function.
In summary, we may conclude that Smith's concept of labor division has survived
the marginal revolution in the form of an aggregate production function centering on the
production factor labor. With regard to the population question, the static theory of
production supports the idea that each additional amount of labor entering an eﬃcient
division of labor causes production to rise and labor productivity to shrink due to
diminishing returns.
2.2 Dynamic Theory
By assuming that all production factors are eﬃciently employed, so far nothing has been
said about the potential dynamic eﬀects, or gains, derived from a division of labor. On
that account, Smith emphasized that
[T]he greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the
greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is anywhere
directed, or applied, seem to have been the eﬀects of the division of labour. 24
Extending the static theory of production toward a dynamic theory of growth, Solow
(1956) and Swan (1956) integrated the CobbDouglas production function into Harrod's
(1939) and Domar's (1946) concepts of intertemporal capital accumulation by using as
main dynamic equation Kt+1 = sYt + (1− δ)Kt, or in units per labor
Kt+1
L
= s
(
Kt
L
)α
+ (1− δ) Kt
L
(1)
with time index t for the corresponding year, annual savings rate s and annual capital
depreciation rate δ. Considering the direction of causality between the production
factors, this framework assumes that the amount of labor is exogenously supplied,
while the amount of capital is allowed to adapt over time. The level of labor is therefore
assumed to be unaﬀected by capital changes, whereas changes in the amount of labor
may generally cause changes in the amount of capital. Again, the rationale behind the
exogenous use of labor as compared to capital can be traced back to classical economics
and in particular to Locke (1689) and McCulloch (1864), who considered labor as the
only source of value, without which capital would be not worth anything.
24 Smith (1776), book I, chapter I.
7
'Tis labour, then which puts the greatest part of value upon land, without
which it would scarcely be worth of any thing. Tis to that we owe the greatest
part of all its useful products;' [. . . ] Locke has here all but established the
fundamental principle on which the science [of economics] rests. Had he
carried his analysis a little farther, he could not have failed to perceive that
neither water, leaves, skins, nor any one of the spontaneous productions of
nature, has any value, except what it derives from the labour required for its
appropriation. The utility of such products makes them be demanded; but
it does not give them value. This is a quality which can be communicated
only through the agency of voluntary labour of some sort or other. [. . . ] It
is to labour, therefore, and to it only, that man owes every thing possessed
of value. 25
On these grounds, dynamic changes in labor productivity can be modeled as a response
to an exogenous labor shock as follows. As a starting point, neoclassical economists
reasonably assume a static equilibrium in which capital accumulation is equal to zero
and capital depreciation equals saving, i.e. for Kt+1 = Kt = K we have
δ
K
L
= s
(
K
L
)α
. (2)
The resulting steady state equilibrium of capital per labor
(
K
L
)∗
= K0
L0
is marked on
the xaxis of ﬁgure 2.1 (ignoring gL2 at this instance). In this situation, a positive labor
shock would statically reduce capital per labor toward K0
L1
, where savings are higher than
capital depreciation. Subsequently, additional capital will be accumulated and capital
per labor eventually reconverges to its original steady state such that K0
L0
= K1
L1
with
K1 > K0 and L1 > L0. As a result, although diminishing returns have reduced labor
productivity in the short run, a growing labor force seems to be capable of accumulating
and maintaining a larger amount of capital in the long run, reﬂecting the abstract gains
from a division of labor, which will be analyzed in more detail at a later point. The
same mechanism applies reversely if labor shrinks. In that case, relative labor scarcity
increases labor productivity in the short run without being able to maintain the old
amount of capital in the long run. As a general result, it might be deducted that every
change in the variable labor is in the long run followed by a proportional change in the
variable capital such that we may write in terms of growth rates
25 Locke (1689) Of Civil Government book ii  42, 43 in McCulloch (1864), part I, chapter I, section
II.
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gY = αgK + (1− α)gL = gL, (3)
where gY , gK and gL denote the growth rates of production, capital and labor respec-
tively.26 Consequently, labor productivity Y
L
would in this framework ultimately remain
constant after a labor shock, since we have gY/L = gY − gL = 0.
It has been argued that this model would be incomplete as it does not account for
the seemingly historically observed increases in labor productivity.27 This claim often
overlooks the eﬀect stemming from a potential decrease in labor growth. Supposing
that labor would increase every period at the same constant rate gL =
Lt+1
Lt
− 1 yields
the following modiﬁed dynamic law and steadystate value for labor productivity:
(1 + gL)
Kt+1
Lt+1
= (1− δ) Kt
Lt
+ s
(
Kt
Lt
)α
⇒
(
Y
L
)∗
=
(
s
δ + gL
) α
1−α
. (4)
Since higher labor growth reduces the steadystate value of labor productivity, we ﬁnd
that an exogenous decrease of labor growth toward gL2 is wellqualiﬁed for causing
labor productivity growth during the transition between steady states (see ﬁgure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: A labor growth slowdown in the Solow model.
26 As Solow emphasized, [T]he common rate of growth is just the exogenously given growth rate of
the labor force. Solow (2000), p. 357.
27 As a result, the additional factor technology (Solow (1956)) or measure of our ignorance
(Abramovitz (1956)) was introduced , embodied in the socalled SolowResidual.
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3 A Population Theory of Growth and Development
3.1 Static Theory
While empirical longrun estimates for production are generally readily obtainable and
generalized capital can only be measured as a residual, we require empirical values
for labor as well as those of production elasticity of labor to test the validity of the
neoclassical model. To this end, the crucial questions arise what labor is supposed to
mean in theory and in what units it thus ought to be measured empirically.28
Theoretically, we will again follow the classical view of Senior (1836), who deﬁned
labor as the voluntary exertion of bodily or mental faculties for the purpose of pro-
duction.29 Such a deﬁnition comprises the quality and the quantity of labor, or to use
a slightly diﬀerent modern wording, skilled as well as unskilled labor. Empirically, the
ﬁrst assessment of economic growth based on the above aggregate production function
was conducted by Cobb and Douglas (1928). Problematically, they used Wicksteed's
production exhaustion theorem30 to interpret the empirical share of labor income on
total income as production elasticity of labor (1− α), whereas they measured the pro-
duction factor L in units of laborers with the following reservation:
Such an index [L] of course makes no allowance for possible changes in the
quality of the laborers or in the intensity of their work. [. . . ] When they
can be measured, then they should be included. 31
Notwithstanding this qualiﬁcation, conventional empirical and theoretical studies still
seem to erroneously follow Cobb and Douglas' provisional model and continue to confuse
the production elasticity of labor with that of the number of laborers without adjusting
28 Unfortunately, while the Cambridge capital controversy has questioned the correct measurement of
the production factor capital, no such debate can be found on the empirical use of the production
factor labor.
29 Senior (1836), p. 152.
30 Since F (K,L) is homogeneous of degree one, the Euler theorem can be applied as follows, where r
represents the marginal product of capital and w the marginal product of labor:
Y = F (K,L) = KαL1−α =
∂Y
∂K
K +
∂Y
∂L
L = αY + (1− α)Y = rK + wL⇔ 1− α = wL
Y
.
[...] under ordinary conditions of competitive industry, it is sensibly or approximately true that if
every factor of production draws a remuneration determined by its marginal eﬃciency or signiﬁcance,
the whole product will be exactly distributed. Wicksteed (1894), p. 38.
31 Cobb and Douglas (1928), p. 149.
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for the quality of the laborers.32 To make up for this defect we may ﬁrst attempt to
assess whether a labor measurement exists that can account for the quality as well as
the quantity of labor. However, once ﬁnding that it is still not possible to measure
a unit of labor quality without making fantastic assumptions, it will  in pursuing
the population question and in explaining economic development  appear much more
promising to focus on a theoretical conception that separates out the quantity of labor.
We will therefore now discuss the necessary adjustments for a neoclassical model based
on unskilled labor as central variable.
Firstly, we deﬁne an unskilled individual I as an individual who has just entered
the labor market and has therefore become productive for the ﬁrst time. We may then
deﬁne a unit of unskilled labor n as the amount of labor provided by such an unskilled
individual. Eventually, the aggregate amount of unskilled labor Lu is deﬁned as one
unit of unskilled labor multiplied by the number W of all productive individuals, i.e.
Lu = I·n·W . Since we are interested in the annual amount of unskilled labor of the
average individual, these values can be standardized using I = n = 1.33 In contrast
to Cobb and Douglas, who employed the number of laborers W to measure the overall
amount of unskilled labor, this work uses the size of the population for the following
reasons. Firstly, from a theoretical point of view, unskilled labor moves  although
with a maturity lag  almost proportionally with population. Empirically, population
data generating per capita values are amongst the most objective and transparent
measurements, relatively easy to collect, and arguably possess the longest historical
time series. Finally, we are mainly interested in production per capita, i.e. (population)
productivity instead of productivity per laborer.
To exhaustively subdivide labor into independent components, we will then refer to
the production factor displaying the quantity of labor as population(N), while terming
the remaining factor human capital (H), incorporating the residual quality of labor. The
latter is supposed to comprise every acquired productive skill in addition to unskilled
labor. Statically, like every other production factor, population and human capital must
32 For example, Barro and SalaiMartin (2003) use units of labor instead of units of laborers, workers
or population in order to calculate output per worker and output per capita, pp. 2728.
33 The dimension of time enters negatively into all the quantities we are discussing. 'Land' is use
of land per unit of time. Labour is hours of work per unit of time, etc. But the universality of
this condition enables us to dispense with any special consideration of it. Wicksteed (1894), p. 20,
footnote.
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necessarily exhibit diminishing returns. Following Mankiw et al.'s (1992) extension of
the Solow model34, this subdivision suggests the use of the production function
Y = KαL1−α = KαHβN1−α−β with 0 < α, β, (1− α− β) < 1. (5)
3.2 Dynamic Theory
Given our new static division of production, we will now again inquire into the rela-
tionships between the production factors. In section 2 we assumed that the decisive
causal relation runs from labor, the source of all value, to capital accumulation. We
will see that this causal eﬀect can be renewed inasmuch as population growth may be
considered as source of all human capital as well as capital accumulation  a result
that can be derived if we take a more detailed look at Smith's dynamic eﬀects from
the division of labor. According to Smith, all men are born equal and every worker
acquires in the same way both productive skills and productive capital over his lifetime
to optimize individual production. Senior remarked about Smiths main idea:
The advantages derived from the division of labour are attributed by Smith
to three diﬀerent circumstances. 'First, to the increase of dexterity in every
particular workman; secondly, to the saving of the time which is commonly
lost in passing from one species of work to another; and lastly, to the inven-
tion of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and
enable one man to do the work of many.' 35
These eﬀects are all reducible to gains from specialization and can account for an ex-
haustive dynamic theory of growth. Firstly, the saving of time is owed to specialization
across a given territory. Obviously, as soon as new individuals are added to the division
of labor, the economy becomes more densely populated and the eﬃcient geographical
distribution reduces any kind of transport costs between production processes. This
advantage simply reﬂects the static use of the factor N including diminishing returns
through the relative abundance of this factor. Secondly, the increase in dexterity is
owed to specialization over time. If the same production process is performed frequently
on tighter geographical constraints, individuals will successively tend to improve their
34 This paper makes two important deviations from the Mankiw et al. (1992) model: Population is
used instead of labor and total factor productivity is assumed to be nonexistent, following the
Wicksteed approach.
35 Smith (1776) in Senior (1836), p. 159.
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productive skills by way of learning and subsequently use their experience to become a
specialist in their ﬁeld.36 Since skilled labor H can only be accumulated by repeatedly
employing unskilled labor N , population growth can be rightfully viewed as the only
source of human capital accumulation. Thirdly, the invention of machines refers to
a regular tendency toward automation of specialized processes. Whenever production
processes have been subdivided into such small steps that their repetition can be eas-
ily conducted through some nonhuman agency, capital K tends to be substituted for
labor H and N . Accordingly, we may state that population, the starting and ending
point of all economic activity37, is really the source of all value and the most regular
trigger of economic growth. Hence the peopling process is essential38 and we shall
start every inquiry on economic growth by examining the eﬀects stemming from any
foregoing population changes. As Young (1928) put it,
Senior's positive doctrine is well known, and there were others who made
note of the circumstance that with the growth of population and of markets,
new opportunities for the division of labour appear and new advantages at-
tach to it. In this way, and in this way only, were the generally commonplace
things which they said about ' improvements ' [. . . ]. 39
Based on Smith's gains from labor division, we can derive additional static and dynamic
interpretations of the neoclassical growth model. Since capital and human capital
are in the same way frequently and proportionally accumulated after new productive
individuals have entered the economy, we should reasonably assume that human capital
is subject to the same law of accumulation as capital (δH = δK ≡ δ, sH = sK ≡ s) and
can be measured  like any other production factor  in the same complex unit. Thus,
we can make use of a model, where population N is separated out of the iniﬁnite number
of production factors and where human capital and physical capital are aggregated into
a complex production factor generalized capital, or broad capital C, as follows.40
36 Men are much more likely to discover easier and readier methods of attaining any object, when
the whole attention of their minds is directed towards that single object. Smith (1776), book I,
chapter I.
37 Bairoch (1988), p. 127.
38 Lange (2012), p. 21.
39 Young (1928), p. 529.
40 Intuitively, the argumentation follows Smith: The improved dexterity of a workman may be con-
sidered in the same light as a machine or instrument of trade which facilitates and abridges labour,
and which, though it costs a certain expense, repays that expense with a proﬁt. Smith (1776),
book I, chapter I.
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Y = KαHβN1−α−β ≡ CγN1−γ with 0 < γ < 1 (6)
(1 + gN )
Ct+1
Nt+1
= s
Yt
Nt
+ (1− δ) Ct
Nt
(7)
With regard to the causal relation between production factors and in analogy to the
old labor model of section 2, we assume that exogenous changes in population are the
source of all value and that broad capital would in the long run react proportionally
to population. Consequently, constant population growth would again cause constant
capital growth, constant economic growth and constant production per capita. The
corresponding stable steady state with Ct+1
Nt+1
= Ct
Nt
= C
N
is given by
(
Y
N
)∗
= y∗ =
(
s
δ + gN
) γ
1−γ
=
(
s
δ + b− d
) γ
1−γ
=
(s
b
) γ
1−γ
(8)
where we have deﬁned the constant (natural) population growth rate as gN = b− d =
birth rate  death rate and made the assumption that δ = d, since the skills of a
population as well as the (unskilled) population itself depreciate with the death rate
(δ = δH = δN = d).
41
However, allowing for a varying birth rate, the productivity ratio of two subsequent
steady states providing the following unitfree measurement of the growth factor
would still depend on the birth rate:42
y∗t
y∗t−j
=
(
bt−j
bt
) γ
1−γ
with 0 < γ < 1. (9)
From this formula it becomes apparent that the steadystate growth rate of produc-
tivity is determined neither by the level of population nor by population growth itself.
Instead it is governed by the (inverted) growth of population growth. What is more,
this intertemporal representation of productivity allows us to distinguish the essentially
conﬂicting eﬀects of population growth. While the numerator of the right hand side
of equation (9) has a delayed positive eﬀect on productivity growth, representing the
gains from labor division, the denominator aﬀects productivity immediately negatively,
representing the losses from diminishing returns. Ultimately, the population question
41 Obviously, if the death rate is high and population is written oﬀ, H is increasingly lost andK cannot
be maintained and depreciates correspondingly. If the death rate is zero (and the birth rate positive),
population grows inﬁnitely together with human capital and physical capital. Depreciation rate as
well as death rate normally lie within the range [0.01, 0.04] (see also Mankiw et al. (1992), p. 410).
42 The author is well aware of the vast literature on endogenized savings. However, this issue should
be disentangled from attempting to answer the population question.
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boils down to these two opposing forces describing the essential conﬂict by which we
have to judge population growth economically.
The 'population' question [. . . ] will then be found ultimately to turn on a
balance between the signiﬁcance to each man of other free men regarded as
appliances and the signiﬁcance to him of the space those other men occupy.
Is their room [eﬀects from diminishing returns] or their company [eﬀects
from labor division] the more important? 43
More explicitly, as is depicted in ﬁgure 3.1, a steadily decreasing birth rate is expected to
yield continuous productivity growth, as in this case the right hand side of equation (9)
will be larger than one.44 Hence, this theory suggests that the causes for the prevalence
Figure 3.1: A population slowdown in the Solow model.
of sustainable development in any economy may be reduced to the beneﬁcial eﬀects
from labor division outweighing the detrimental eﬀects of diminishing returns as long
as the birth rate is decreasing. Whenever, in contrast, the birth rate increases, the losses
from diminishing returns tend to outweigh the gains from labor division and to create
a situation of economic regress. This subject of overpopulation due to diminishing
returns seems equally obvious as scientiﬁcally neglected or avoided.
43 Wicksteed (1894), p. 22, footnote.
44 A result that has been conﬁrmed by a number of studies on economic development including Sachs
and Malaney (2002).
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4 Empirical Evaluation of the SteadyState Equation
4.1 Methodology
To support the above model, the subsequent empirical exercise will focus on the esti-
mation of steadystate equation (9) and proceed as follows. To begin with, production
per capita data, measured by the ratio of annual real GDP to population, and birth
rate data, measured by the ratio of annual births to population, are readily available
over a certain time span. To employ an appropriate j−value, we will in the following
theoretically justify a presumed time span between steady states. To ﬁnd evidence of
a causal relationship, we will recover the remaining parameter γ by estimating the ex-
pression β = γ
1−γ . Based on the assumption of constant returns to scale and indicating
a negative eﬀect of a change in the birth rate on productivity, the estimated value of
the parameter γ is expected to lie within the range (0, 1). As a reference point, Cobb
and Douglas (1928) estimated the production elasticity of capital of the labor model
to be α ≈ 0.25. More recently, Mankiw et al.'s (1992) estimations suggested a param-
eter value α ≈ 0.33 and most conventional calibrations assume a production elasticity
of capital within the range (0.25, 0.33). Nonetheless, when withdrawing the variable
human capital from the variable labor and adding it to the variable physical capital,
Mankiw et al.'s estimator rises to α ≡ γ ≈ 0.66. Such an estimator would suggest a
much higher exponent γ
1−γ in equation (9) and correspondingly a larger leverage eﬀect
of changes in the birth rate on GDP per capita. In fact, if the following estimation con-
ﬁrms the conjecture that γ ≈ 0.66, population growth may have a much larger impact
on economic development than is usually suspected.
Ideally, once we have estimated a consistent parameter value, we can conﬁrm or
reject the time frame presumption for j. To estimate equation (9), we will employ the
usual ordinary bivariate least squares (OLS) method. Due to the fact that the OLS
estimator is the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE), equation (9) will be linearized
by taking logs of both ratios, yielding the approximate growth of GDP per capita as
explained variable and the approximate growth of birth rate as explanatory variable
(see equation (10)).45 OLS estimation is in this case a valid approach, since the variable
birth rate is viewed as the (independent) source of all value in GDP per capita.46 This
45 For an alternative methodology including a measurement of convergence see Mankiw et al. (1992).
46 Employing a vector autoregression generates insigniﬁcant results due to the large number of required
lags and, therefore, parameters.
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also means that the additional use of an intercept to account for unobserved eﬀects is
not necessary.
ln
(
y∗t
y∗t−j
)
= β ln
(
bt
bt−j
)
with β = − γ
1− γ < 0. (10)
As can be seen, an ideal determination of β would only be realized under a compar-
ison of two steady states y∗t , y
∗
t−j. Since the transition from one steady state to another
might take a certain number of years after a shock in the variable birth rate, we have
to account for this transitional period by using an appropriate value for j. Although
the birth rate is expected to aﬀect productivity immediately negatively through bt, its
positive eﬀect of labor division is realized with a delay through bt−j. To account for the
latter eﬀect, it has been stated that a newborn cohort will raise productivity only after
it has generated the ability of unskilled labor with a maturity lag of one generation
of φ years, and it seems plausible to assume a period of at least15 years. In addition,
broad capital accumulation by way of dexterity and the invention of machines has
been assumed to take place over the whole working life of a cohort, i.e. we add a max-
imum amount of ψ ≈ 50 years.47 Thus, since the above combined gains are probably
fully achieved after j = φ+ ψ years, we must assume a maximum accumulation period
of j ≈ 65 years to account for the transition between steady states. Consequently, ideal
results from an OLS estimation can only be expected if we could employ time series of
GDP per capita and birth rate over a time horizon of 2j years where the birth rate stays
constant for the ﬁrst j years, changing abruptly to another level in j + 1 (treatment)
and remaining constant on the new level for j years, as is exempliﬁed in ﬁgure 4.1.
After the birth rate has changed, GDP per capita is predicted to react over the latter
period (treatment eﬀect).
4.2 Estimation of γ and j
Firstly, to get an idea about the empirical relationship between birth rate and GDP per
capita, available aggregate global data series provided by the World Bank are displayed
in ﬁgure 7.1 in appendix 7.2. Here, we observe a relatively steady decline of the birth
rate as well as a parallel rise in GDP per capita over the period 19602014. The
corresponding calculation of the aggregate parameter yields βg = −2.0 (see column (1)
47 For a more extensive lag model, see e.g. Becker and Murphy (1992) or Liso et al. (2001).
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of two time series required for an ideal estimation of equation (11).
of table 4.1) and we conclude that an average birth rate reduction by 1% is connected
with an average rise of GDP per capita by about 2%.
Secondly, using country-level data,48 we ﬁnd that the birth rate decreased during
the period 19602014 in each of the 104 available series.49 Consequently, we would
expect a rise in GDP per capita in every country at least until the year 2014, which
we will thus use as reference year for the terminal steady state. To ﬁnd evidence for
the expected relationship, we plot the dependent variable (approximate productivity
growth) against the independent variable (approximate growth of birth rate) over the
complete 55year period for all 104 countries with available data (see ﬁgure 7.3) and
estimate the OLS coeﬃcient of equation (11) (column (2) of table 4.1).
ln
(
yi,2014
yi,1960
)
= β ln
(
bi,2014
bi,1960
)
for i = country 1, .., country 104 (11)
The Rsquared of 0.698 indicates that the greater part of the variation in GDP per
capita is explained by variation in the birth rate. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient is
somewhat smaller than the aggregate coeﬃcient, which is probably owed to the fact
48 Since population is a relatively immobile factor of production, an estimation on the country level
is expected to yield signiﬁcant results.
49 See table 7.1 in appendix 7.3 for a list of countries studied.
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that the OLS approach does not weigh countries according to their population size.50
Nonetheless, since the coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant, we have found some evidence
of the true parameter β lying approximately within the range [−2.02,−1.56] over the
observed time span 19602014. However, since the above theory states that a change
of the birth rate aﬀects GDP per capita over the following j ≈ 65 years, a calculation
employing a time horizon of merely 55 years probably underestimates the magnitude
of the aggregate coeﬃcient, suggesting a somewhat higher true value.
Thirdly, in order to extend the maximum time span for j toward 65, we turn to the
historical Mitchell (2013) database and estimate the corresponding coeﬃcient for all 36
countries providing data on GDP per capita and birth rate over the period 19492014
(column (3) of table 4.1).51 The greater magnitude of this long-run coeﬃcient as well
as the higher R-squared seem to conﬁrm our expectation.
Table 4.1: Calculated and estimated coeﬃcients.
ln
(
bi,2014
bi,t
)
ln
(
bi,2014
bi,t
)
ln
(
bi,2014
bi,t
)
ln
(
bi,2014
bi,t
)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln
(
yi,2014
yi,t
)
-2.02 -1.56*** -2.19*** -2.16***
(.100) (.134) (0.178)
R² 0.698 0.789 0.94
t 1960 1960 1949 1901
# i 1a 104
a
36b 10b
Sources: a=World Bank (2018), b=Mitchell (2013)
*** indicates signiﬁcance at 1% level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
To show that the true parameter j actually centers around 65 years, we will employ
the World Bank as well as the Mitchell data series and display the evolution of the
coeﬃcient β for increasing j. As is shown in ﬁgure 4.2, the coeﬃcient remains signiﬁcant
for all jvalues. As expected, by increasing the transitional time span j, the coeﬃcient
tends to increase as well until settling at a value of approximately 2.0 after 6065 years.
50 If for example China and India were assigned a weight according to their population size, the value
would be larger.
51 1945 has been left out for obvious reasons.
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Thereafter, the coeﬃcient remains relatively constant52 at an average value of 2.0 and
the 95% conﬁdence interval roughly within the boundaries [−3.0,−1.5] for j > 60.
On the one hand, these observations conﬁrm the predicted strong impact of birth
rate changes on GDP per capita. Since the displayed Rsquared tends to steadily
increas over time and displays a value of 0.94 for j = 112 (column (4) of table 4.1),
it appears that changes in the birth rate are capable of explaining over 90% of the
subsequent GDP per capita growth. On the other hand, they provide evidence of the
idea that the full eﬀect of changes in the birth rate is achieved after approximately 65
years.
Figure 4.2: Magnitude of OLS-estimatorβ (blue) with 95% conﬁdence intervals (gray) andR² (yellow)
with increasing time span j.
As a result, using the average coeﬃcient value for j > 60 as a benchmark, the theory
suggests that a 1% decline in the birth rate causes on average a 2% increase in GDP per
capita over the subsequent 6570 years.53 These values imply that a birth rate reduction
from 4% to 1%  as is observed in developed countries  raises production per capita
by the factor 16.54 Finally, the production elasticity of broad capital γ = β
1+β
can be
52 Constancy is deﬁned as a linear trend with slope parameter < |0.002| over the corresponding time
span.
53 The possibility of reverse causality is dealt with in appendix 7.1.
54 As an empirical comparison, we employ the (longest available) British time series during the period
18022014, where the birth rate decreases from a maximum average value of 4.1% between 1802
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calculated to lie approximately within the 95% conﬁdence interval [0.6, 0.7], conﬁrming
Mankiw et al.'s (1992) estimation results.
5 Uniﬁed Growth Theory
The economic growth and development model put forward in this paper is for the
most part a variation of the neoclassical model suggested by Mankiw et al. (1992).
However, since this neoclassical model has been commonly accused of being incapable
of explaining economic development endogenously,55 the new branch uniﬁed growth
theory has emerged more recently, trying to explain longrun economic development
from a rather demographic perspective and at a very high level of abstraction. Uniﬁed
growth theory was particularly advanced by Galor (2011) and builds on the following
observed stylized facts of economic development.
1. Every economy was at some point over the past three centuries caught in a
regime of stagnation, where productivity remained at a low level and birth rates at a
high level.56
2. Today, almost all economies have left the regime of stagnation in favor of a growth
regime, where productivity increases from a low level to a high level.
3. Roughly at the same time as these economies left the regime of stagnation, a
fertility transition set in, by which the birth rate declined from a high level to a low
level.57
Uniﬁed growth theory tries to make sense out of these stylized facts by initially stat-
ing that a high birth rate was causal for keeping productivity down during the regime
of stagnation. Obviously, our neoclassical model ﬁts perfectly into this framework, as
it provides a sophisticated and well-established theory by which a decreasing birth rate
was equally causal in allowing productivity to increase. This means that the mono-
causal negative relationship between birth rate and productivity continues to operate
and 1826 to a minimum average value of 1.3% between 1974 and 2014 (see ﬁgure 7.2 in appendix
7.3). Since the historical GDP per capita data series by Clark (2009) has raised some debate, the
Broadberry et al. (2015) data over the period 18021870 are analogously employed. The Clark
data suggest an increase in GDP per capita by the factor 20 (βC = −2.54), the Broadberry et al.
data suggest an increase by the factor 26 (βB = −2.78). Here, the Clark data appear to be more
plausible as they are broadly in line with the implications of the World Bank data (βg = −2.02)
and the Mitchell data (βM = −2.12).
55 A view which is, as this paper has shown, probably not correct.
56 See also Clark (2007).
57 See Thompson (1930), who observed the fertility transition as part of the demographic transition.
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over the whole time span under consideration and ﬁgure 4.1 provides the missing link
between the second and the third stylized facts, stating that the fertility transition is
rather a cause for and less a consequence of the escape from stagnation. Furthermore,
this extended uniﬁed growth theory suggests a fourth stylized fact which remains to be
evaluated, namely that
4. approximately 60 years after the fertility transition has been completed, an
economy will enter a new regime of stagnation, where productivity stabilizes on a high
level as long as birth rates remain on a low level.
Finally, a paper on the population question is bound to mention the Malthusian
principle of population as a building stone of uniﬁed growth theory, according to which
fertility is positively aﬀected by economic development. For simplicity, this principle
has been completely avoided in this paper by assuming exogenous population growth.
Nonetheless, a uniﬁed growth theory should ideally include a theory of population that
can explain changes in the birth rate endogenously. 58Here, it is promising to return
to Malthus' (1826) preventive check, which he claimed to be capable of reducing the
birth rate within manageable limits.59
6 Conclusion
In this brief exercise on the population question, the conventional Solow model has
been modiﬁed by renewing classical assumptions. It has been shown that a Solow
model where the production factor labor is replaced with population and which ex-
pressly excludes exogenous technology can account for the largest part of the his-
torically experienced sustainable rise in production per capita. Instead of modeling
technology endogenously, the following assumptions have been used to account for
innovation. Firstly, the CobbDouglas production function is theoretically based on
Smith's assumption of an eﬃcient division of labor. Secondly, the accumulation of
production factors is theoretically based on Smith's gains from the division of labor,
which are made up of specialization across space and time as well as automation of
repetitive laboring processes. This means that every progress that is commonly very
58 The principle of population can be easily modeled by using a law of population accumulation of the
form Nt+1 = bYt − dNt +Nt.
59 [T]he preventive check is perhaps best measured by the smallness of the proportion of yearly births
to the whole population. Malthus (1826), book II, ch.XI.
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loosely termed measure of our ignorance is included in the production factor broad
capital.
With regard to the population question, the size of population has been found
to yield constant long-run returns and therefore to have a positive eﬀect on economic
growth (measured by GDP) and a neutral eﬀect on economic development (measured by
GDP per capita). Although constant returns contradict permanent development, they
do not contradict sustainable development. The corresponding steady-state equation
states that, if positive population growth is reduced from a high level to a lower level,
population pressure from diminishing returns relaxes while the formerly established
division of labor derived from a larger population continues to have a positive eﬀect.
Accordingly, this work suggests that a population growth rate change (in this work
measured in terms of birth rate) is the best predictor for economic development. To
advance economic theory, the above conclusions recommend a further move away from
exogenous and endogenous growth theories toward uniﬁed growth theories to explain
longrun economic development in one framework with the demographic transition.
Evaluating annual data on 104 countries over a period of 55 years and 24 countries
over a period of 114 years, our estimators imply that a birth rate reduction from 4%
to 1%  as it is observed in developed countries  raises production per capita by the
factor 16. If these results are correct, the historically observed decline in fertility can be
suspected of being the cause of most of the observed economic development. Moreover,
our estimations suggest that the production elasticity of broad capital lies in the range
(0.60, 0.75), suggesting a production elasticity of population in the range (0.25, 0.40)
which has often erroneously been calculated to lie in the interval (0.66, 0.75). Although
employing a quite diﬀerent approach, the results are roughly in line with those of
Mankiw et al. (1992) and Ashraf et al. (2013), providing supportive evidence of the
neoclassical growth model. Further research will be required to conﬁrm the idea that
an appropriate form of the aggregate production function might be approximated by
Y = K1/3H1/3N1/3.
While this paper provides a relatively simple approach on productivity, adhering
to Cobb and Douglas' (1928) method of attack, the model should be extended by
accounting for a fourth constant production factor  land  that is not subject to
accumulation and depreciation. This will probably imply that even the density of the
population is relevant in determining development and that population growth exhibits
diminishing returns in the long run.
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Under the assumption of perfect competition, a calculation of γ may alternatively
be conducted by using the production exhaustion theorem to determine the income
share of population. To this end, we would have to employ average unskilled labor
wages or minimum wages with regard to the whole population (which may in fact be
termed geographical wages or population wages) and to compute their income share
(1− γ) on total GDP. This share should be found to lie in the interval [0.25, 0.40].
Finally, since physical and human capital accumulation of a country are sometimes
strongly encouraged by foreign investments, future research on the topic may allow
for a varying national savings rate. These external adjustments toward an eﬃcient
international division of labor may account for the remaining unobserved variation in
our regressions.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Reverse Causality: A Population Objection
The observed correlation between birth rate and GDP per capita has prompted large
academic circles to believe that rising productivity generally induces individuals to
lower their fertility, since running a regression for the (inverted) equation
ln
(
bt
bt−j
)
= α ln
(
yt
yt−j
)
(12)
would naturally yield an inverted signiﬁcant coeﬃcient α = 1
β
.60 However, this hypoth-
esis must be rejected for many reasons of which we may state merely two. Firstly, due
to a fertility decision lag and a pregnancy lag, a contemporaneous eﬀect of yt on bt can
barely exist.
Secondly, since we stated that birth rate has a delayed eﬀect on GDP per capita,
we may also test for a delayed eﬀect (l) of GDP per capita on birth rate of the form
ln
(
bt
bt−j
)
= α ln
(
yt−l
yt−l−j
)
. (13)
However, although in developed countries GDP per capita has steadily increased over
the 20th century, we observe  beginning in the 1970s  a constant birth rate in those
countries.61 If GDP per capita would indeed have a negative impact on birth rate, we
should instead observe a further declining birth rate after 1970, which is not the case.62
60 See for example Becker and Lewis (1973). This currently quite popular idea is widely known as the
"demographic economic paradox".
61 See footnote 49 for our empirical deﬁnition of constancy. The longest series displaying a constant
birth rate is given by the UK-data (40 years).
62 Further reading on the rejection of the BeckerHypothesis is provided by Galor (2011).
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7.2 Historical Development of Birth Rate and GDP per Capita
Figure 7.1: Birth rate (blue) and indexed GDP per capita (green), aggregate global data, 19602014.
Source: World Bank (2018).
Figure 7.2: Birth rate (blue) and indexed GDP per capita with exponential trend (green, Clark data
orange), Britain, 18022014.
Source: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981), Broadberry et al. (2015), Clark (2009),
Mitchell (2010), World Bank (2018)
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7.3 Cross-Sectional Relationship between (Negative) Growth of
Birth Rate and Growth of GDP per Capita
Figure 7.3: Scatterplot of 104 countries comparing (negative) growth of birth rates (xaxis) and
growth of GDP per capita (yaxis) between 1960 and 2014.
Source: World Bank (2018).
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7.4 List of Countries
Table 7.1: List of 104 countries studied. 36 countries with long-run data are starred.
Algeria Germany* Nicaragua
Argentina* Ghana Niger
Australia* Greece* Nigeria
Austria* Guatemala Norway*
Bangladesh Guinea Pakistan
Belgium* GuineaBissau Panama*
Benin Haiti Paraguay
Bolivia Honduras* Peru
Botswana Hong Kong Philippines*
Brazil India* Portugal*
Burkina Faso Indonesia Romania
Burundi Iran, Islamic Rep. Rwanda
Cameroon Ireland* Senegal
Canada* Israel* Sierra Leone
Central African Republic Italy* Singapore
Chad Jamaica* South Africa
Chile* Japan* Spain*
China Jordan Sri Lanka*
Colombia* Kenya Sweden*
Congo, Dem. Rep. Korea, Rep. Switzerland*
Congo, Rep. Lesotho Syrian Arab Republic
Costa Rica Madagascar Tanzania
Cote d'Ivoire Malawi Thailand
Cyprus* Malaysia Togo
Denmark* Mali Trinidad and Tobago
Dominican Republic Mauritania Tunisia
Ecuador Mauritius Turkey
Egypt, Arab Rep.* Mexico* Uganda
El Salvador* Morocco United Kingdom*
Equatorial Guinea Mozambique United States
Ethiopia Myanmar Uruguay*
Finland* Namibia Venezuela, RB*
France Nepal Zambia
Gabon Netherlands* Zimbabwe
Gambia, The New Zealand* (Cuba)*
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